In any war, what truly counts is the balance of forces. In the fall of 2022, Ukraine had about 450,000 troops deployed, while Russia had around 220,000, a third of whom were Donbass fighters. The numbers told the story: Russia lost 10,000 square kilometers in Kharkiv within a week and later withdrew from Kherson city, only 40 days after declaring it part of the Russian Federation.
But the battlefield isn’t the real war. The real battle happens in force generation—essentially, the race to build armies. Territorial shifts are often just hints at this underlying struggle for troop numbers.
Now, for once, we’ve got some concrete updates on this “real war” of force-building.
First, independent reports confirm that Russia has come close to its monthly recruitment target of 30,000 new volunteers, signing up about 166,000 recruits in the first half of 2024. While sign-on bonuses had to be raised repeatedly, they’ve kept drawing recruits.
Meanwhile, Ukraine’s Hromadske reports a different trend. The number of recruits in basic training has dropped by 40%, from 35,000 a few months ago to 21,000 now. This decline is notable, as 35,000 recruits in training likely followed Ukraine’s updated mobilization law from May 18. Just five months later, that stream’s slowed significantly—troubling news for Kyiv.
Ukraine’s basic training lasts about a month, followed by additional training of up to two months once recruits reach their units, similar to Russia’s system. This means that since May, Ukraine’s camps have likely trained four to five classes of 35,000 to 21,000 recruits and are now training another group of 21,000. And that’s without counting tens of thousands training abroad.
In short, Ukraine’s mobilization over the past six months has likely added between 140,000 and 168,000 recruits at home, with many more trained overseas. Between June and November, both Russia and Ukraine will have generated roughly the same number of troops—significant for both sides.
Currently, Moscow likely has a slight edge in the theater, with an estimated 550,000 troops compared to Ukraine’s 420,000. But this advantage isn’t yet decisive. At the current rate, Russia could add around 30,000 troops monthly, while Ukraine brings in about 20,000, meaning Russia’s lead in troop numbers will grow gradually.
Why, though, is a 150-million-strong Russia only building its army a bit faster than a 30-million-strong Ukraine, three years into this conflict? It’s a puzzling reality, but for now, it keeps the balance in this grueling fight.
